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and in determining the result of the conflict among the other fixed-technology centripetal and
centrifugal forces. The results of this trade-off depend on which of the effects produced by different
trade costs levels prevail. Particularly, if trade costs are very high, manufacturing ends up being
completely agglomerated in the region that has an initial technological advantage, because firms
in the lagging regions are unable to benefit from the interregional potential knowledge spill-overs.
Thus, we like to stress that our results reverse the usual conclusion of New Economic Geography
models that high trade costs favors economic dispersion by showing that high trade costs favor
the agglomeration of firms in the more productive region.
Appendix A. Sustainability of agglomeration of the manufacturing sector in region
v.
Agglomeration of the manufacturing sector in region v is an equilibrium if sales of a (potential)
deviant firm relocating in region r are less than the level required to break even, that is if:
Qmir < Q
∗
mir
Let us consider as given the regional levels of the technology ar and av.
A manufacturing firm has positive (negative) profits if its production is higher (lower) than
the amount required to break even, Q∗mir, that is given by
Q∗mir = ar
where r = s, n.
Let us consider the case in which the manufacturing sector is fully agglomerated in region v
and a firm that is a potential deviant in region r. This firm decides to start its production in
region r if the demand that it faces by producing in region r is higher than (or equal to) the
amount Q∗mir required to break even by producing in this region. The relationship between the
two regional break even quantities is:
Q∗mir =
ar
av
Q∗miv (33)
30
where r, v = n, s and v 6= r.
When the manufacturing sector is fully agglomerated in region v, the composite good price
indexes in region v and in region r are respectively:
pmv = n
1
1−σ
v pv and pmr = n
1
1−σ
v τpv (34)
The demand for variety i produced in region v is:
Qmiv =
Emv +Emr
nvpv
(35)
Moreover, given the free entry and exit hypothesis for manufacturing firms, each firm in region v
produces the quantity required to break even:
Q∗miv = Qmiv
Hence, the zero profit level of output of the potential deviant firm in region r is given by:
Q∗mir =
ar
av
(Emv +Emr)
nvpv
(36)
The demand for variety i produced by the potential deviant in r is:
Qmir = p
−σ
r
µ
1
p1−σmr
Emr + τ1−σ
1
p1−σmv
Emv
¶
(37)
Substituting the price indexes from (34) into (37), it is possible to express the deviant firm’s
demand function as:
Qmir =
µ
pr
pv
¶−σ µτσ−1Emr + τ1−σEmv
nvpv
¶
(38)
From (13) we can derive relative prices (pr/pv):
pr
pv
=
av
ar
µ
pmr
pmv
¶µµ
whr
whv
¶γ µ
wlr
wlv
¶1−γ−µ
From the regional price indexes of the composite good (34) we can derive the relative price index:
pmv
pmr
= τ−1
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In order to attract skilled workers in region r we know that the deviant firm has to offer them at
least the same real wage that they gain in region v. Therefore, the following condition must hold:
whr
whv
=
µ
pmv
pmr
¶−µc
= τµc (39)
Moreover, the wage of unskilled workers in region r (wlr) is equal to 1, because it is equal to the
agricultural price (the numéraire of the model). Therefore, we may rewrite the ratio of the price
of the varieties produced in the two regions as:
pr
pv
=
av
ar
τµ+γµc
µ
1
wlv
¶1−γ−µ
(40)
Substituting (40) into (38) and eliminating nvpv yields the ratio between the demand for the
potential deviant firm (Qmir) and the break even amount for region r (Q∗mir):
Qmir
Q∗mir
=
µ
av
ar
¶1−σ
τ1−σ(1+µ+γµc)
µ
1
wlv
¶−σ(1−γ−µ)Ã¡τ2(σ−1) − 1¢Emr
Emv +Emr
+ 1
!
(41)
Then we compute expenditures on manufactures in both regions, in order to substituteEmr/ (Emv +Emr)
in the previous expression. When firms and skilled workers are fully agglomerated in the region
v, these are respectively:
Emr = µcL¯ (42)
and
Emv = µc
¡
wlvL¯+ whvH¯
¢
+ µnvpvQmiv (43)
Moreover, given the free entry and exit condition, the wages of skilled workers in region v corre-
spond to the share γ of total revenues of firms in v:
whvH¯ = γnvpvQmiv (44)
Using (35), (43) and (44) expenditures on the composite manufactured good in region v are:
Emv =
µcwlvL¯+ (µcγ + µ)Emr
(1− µcγ − µ)
(45)
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Finally, substituting Emr from (42) into (45), we obtain that Emv is:
Emv =
µcwlvL¯+ (µcγ + µ)µc L¯
(1− µcγ − µ)
(46)
Therefore:
Emr
Emv +Emr
=
(1− µcγ − µ)
wlv + 1
(47)
Substituting Emr/(Emv +Emr) from (47) into (41), we obtain the following expression:
Qmir
Q∗mir
=
³
av
asr
´1−σ
τ1−σ(1+µ+γµc)
³
1
wlv
´−σ(1−γ−µ)µ(τ2(σ−1)−1)(1−µcγ−µ)
wlv+1
+ 1
¶
(48)
Finally, we evaluate the wage of unskilled workers in the core region (wlv) in order to substitute
it into (48). We observe that this wage may be either equal to 1 or higher than 1. Indeed, we
point out that the wage of unskilled workers in region v can never be smaller than 1, because in
this case the traditional good would not be produced in the peripheral region r, given that the
production cost and, therefore, the price would be smaller in region v.
Hence, when the wages of unskilled workers are the same for the two regions (wlv = wlr),
then the traditional good may be produced in both of them because wlv = pav = par = wlr. By
contrast, the traditional good is not produced in the core region r when wlv > 1.
To obtain the wage of unskilled workers we compute the sum of expenditures on the composite
good in the two regions from (42) and (46):
Emv +Emr =
µc
1− µ− µcγ
¡
wlvL¯+ L¯
¢
(49)
where µc 6= (1− µ) /γ.
We know that, because of the free entry and exit condition of firms, the total amount of wages
paid to unskilled workers in region v is equal to the share (1− µ− γ) of total revenues:
wlvL¯ = (1− µ− γ)nvpvQmiv (50)
From (35), (49) and (50) we derive the wages of unskilled workers as a function of the parameters
of the model:
wlv =
(1− µ− γ)µc
(1− µ)(1− µc)
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where µ, µc 6= 1, µc 6= (1− µ) /γ.
Hence, wlv > 1 when:
µc >
1− µ
2(1− µ)− γ = µ
∗
c
where γ 6= 2(1−µ). Wages cannot be lower than 1 because in this case the traditional good would
be produced in region v and not in region r.
On the contrary, when 0 < µc 0 µ∗c , the wages of unskilled workers in the core v must be equal
to 1 if the traditional good is produced in the periphery r.
Therefore we may have the two following cases.
When 0 < µc 0 µ∗c , agglomeration of manufacturing firms in region v is an equilibrium if the
ratio Qmir/Q∗mir from (41) is smaller than 1:
Qmir
Q∗mir
=
³
av
ar
´1−σ
τ1−σ(1+µ+γµc)
µ
(τ2(σ−1)−1)(1−µcγ−µ)
2 + 1
¶
< 1 (51)
Otherwise, when 1 > µc > µ
∗
c , agglomeration of the manufacturing sector in region v is an
equilibrium when:
Qmir
Q∗mir
=
³
av
ar
´1−σ
τ1−σ(1+µ+γµc)
³
(1−µ)(1−µc)
(1−µ−γ)µc
´−σ(1−γ−µ) h³
τ2(σ−1) − 1
´
(1− µ)(1− µc) + 1
i
< 1
(52)
Appendix B.
To prove that profits in a neighborhood of a long run equilibrium can be written as a function
of the number of firms n
πi = u(n) (53)
it is necessary to determine the short run equilibrium, which is defined as a set of solutions to
equations (54)-(58) below, once nn and ns are given. We express them in matrix form. To this end,
variables without suffix r define vectors, variables with superscripteare 2x2 diagonal matrix with
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